Dug into the rugged mountains, the al Qaeda forces had the high ground, with unobstructed fields of fire and considerable cover. forces with mortars, machine guns, artillery and small arms, Hagenbeck said. Rather than flee, al Qaeda leaders declared a jihad, or holy war, and brought 500 reinforcements into the valley for a set-piece battle, bombarding both the Afghan and U.S. intelligence believed al Qaeda would essentially melt away and flee through seven established escape routes toward Pakistan to the east, 1,500 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Division troops flew in behind al Qaeda once the battle began and assumed blocking positions at all seven mountain passes. Special Forces assaulted the valley from the west along the old Soviet invasion route to try to convince the al Qaeda forces that they faced the same style of attack.īecause U.S. On March 2, hundreds of Afghan militiamen accompanied by U.S. intelligence determined that about 500 al Qaeda fighters were massing in three villages in the area - terrain where Afghan fighters had twice defeated major Soviet invasions during the 1980s. forces began planning for a battle in the Shahikot Valley in February 2002, after U.S. "It says to me that the enemy got into a fight, realized what they got into, and hasn't picked that fight again." Kevin Wilkerson, commander of the 10th Mountain's 2nd Brigade, who led ground forces during Anaconda's second half. "How many large battles have we had in Afghanistan since Anaconda?" said Col. Hagenbeck refused to give a specific number, saying only that it was "hundreds." Other officers from units within Hagenbeck's 10th Mountain Division, which fought the battle with troops from the 101st Airborne, put the number in excess of 700 and said they had detailed information to back up the claim. The commanders also stood by their earlier claims - questioned by Afghans and some journalists on the battlefield - that large numbers of al Qaeda fighters had been killed in the fighting. forces had successfully blocked seven mountain escape routes from the Shahikot Valley in eastern Afghanistan and had allowed only small numbers of al Qaeda fighters to flee to Pakistan.
Hagenbeck and other key battlefield commanders insisted, despite criticism from some Afghans during and after the three-week battle, that U.S. But I don't think it is ever going to replace the soldier on the ground." "I view technology as an enabler, and we want more and more of it. "We firmly believe if you're going to control terrain and populations, you've got to do it with a force that can be sustained over time," Hagenbeck said in an interview. "Buster" Hagenbeck said Anaconda underscores the limitations of both intelligence and precision bombing in "complex terrain" such as the rugged mountains of Afghanistan or the dense urban environment of Baghdad. military poised for a likely invasion of Iraq, Army Maj. intelligence apparatus did not identify 50 percent of the enemy's positions on the mountainous battlefield. A year after the last major ground engagement in the Afghan war, the commander of Operation Anaconda called the battle a "success story" that decimated al Qaeda's last stronghold - even though the vast U.S.
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